FIRST
DIVISION
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DAKILA
TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 152922 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: July
12, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 March 2002, in CA-GR CV No. 41927, which reversed
the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 16, dated 29 December 1992, in
Civil Case No. 92-60101, ordering herein respondent to pay herein petitioner
the amount of P1,684,219.82, with 12% interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint on 6 February 1992, until fully paid.
Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the sale
and lease of laboratory instrumentation, process control instrumentation, and
the trade of laboratory chemicals and supplies.
Respondent is also a duly organized domestic corporation which owns and
operates the
On
2.1 For a period of two (2)
years from date of signing hereof or from
2.2 DAKILA shall provide
MEDICAL CITY with consumables free of charge for two (2) years, provided, that
reagent trays and sample cuvettes, reaction trays,
and pump tubes must be reused for a minimum of fifty (50) times.
2.3 The consideration for the
lease of the TECHNICON RA 1000 shall depend on the number of tests that
a. 150 – 200 tests/day = P26.00/test
b. 201 – 250 tests/day = 24.00/test
c. 251 and above/day = 22.00/test
x x x
x
2.5 Ownership – The TECHNICON RA 1000 shall
remain the property of DAKILA during the entire duration of this contract. At the end of the two (2) year period
however, ownership over the equipment shall be transferred by DAKILA to
Several months after the execution of said Agreement, petitioner averred that
after reviewing its records, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed
to report a great number of tests conducted on the leased equipment, in excess
of the 150 minimum tests that it had been paying petitioner, based on the
amount of reagents ordered by respondent, for use in the operation of the “TECHNICON
RA 1000.” Petitioner alleged that as of
November 1991, the value of the unreported excess tests made by respondent
amounted to P2.8 million pesos.
After a series of correspondence between the parties regarding the
alleged unreported tests, petitioner, through its General Manager Richard Tee,
reduced its claim to P1,684,219.82, in
consideration of the assertion of respondent that petitioner failed to take
into account allowances for the use of reagents for quality control and
calibration tests which form part of standard laboratory procedures.
Despite the reduction of the amount demanded by petitioner, respondent
maintained that it had not conducted the alleged excess tests and is therefore
not liable to petitioner for any amount beyond the minimum number of tests to
be paid under the contract. Thus,
petitioner instituted an action for collection of sum of money and damages against
respondent before the RTC of Manila, Branch 16.
On
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
I.
On plaintiff’s
complaint:
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of
P1,684,219.82 as actual damages representing the value of the unreported tests,
with 12% interest from February 6, 1992, the date of the filing of the
complaint, until fully paid;
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of
P8,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
3. Ordering defendant to pay costs.
II.
On defendant’s
counterclaims:
1. Upon full payment by the defendant of the amount of
P1,684,219.82 plus accrued interest as above adverted to, plaintiff is directed
to execute the deed of absolute sale and proper documentations to transfer
ownership of the TECHNICON RA 1000 Analyzer with Data Manager to defendant.
2. DISMISSING the other counterclaims of defendant.[4]
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied by
the lower court. Thereafter, respondent
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
On
Hence, the instant
Petition.
At the outset, we must first emphasize that this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court, in numerous instances, have had
occasion to explain that it is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. However,
we have also ruled that there are instances when this Court may resolve factual
issues, such as: 1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; 3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[5] Consequently, in order to settle the
controversy before us, this Court has decide to review
the evidence presented before the trial court.
It is clear from the Lease-Purchase Agreement signed by both parties that
the amount to be paid by respondent for the lease of the “TECHNICON RA 1000” shall
be based on the number of tests conducted daily by respondent using the said
equipment, which in no case shall be less than 150 tests per day. Thus, it is unmistakable that petitioner may
validly charge respondent for tests made by the latter in excess of the minimum
150 tests per day. There is no question
that respondent had indeed religiously complied with its obligation to pay for
the lease of the equipment in the amount corresponding to the minimum 150 tests
per day. However, it is the alleged
excess tests conducted by respondent, using the “TECHNICON RA 1000,” which
petitioner now claims respondent must pay in accordance with the Lease-Purchase
Agreement.
Petitioner contends that, as evidenced by the delivery receipts signed by
respondent’s representatives, it had discovered that respondent has ordered an
unusually large number of reagents than that which could be expected had
respondent only been conducting the minimum number of 150 tests per day. Based on the number of reagents ordered,
petitioner calculated the number of tests per day that could be performed using
such amount of reagents. And from such
computation, petitioner concluded that respondent has exceeded the minimum
number of tests and has failed to report such for billing purposes.
Respondent, on the other hand, deny that there were tests in excess of
the minimum 150 tests per day that were conducted using the “TECHNICON RA 1000.” Respondent disagrees with petitioner’s
computation, asserting that the number of tests assigned to a kit is not fixed
but relative, and that petitioner failed to appropriate an allowance for
wastage (leftover fluid on transfer instruments or containers), calibration,
and quality control procedures.
This assertion was addressed by petitioner in a letter dated 15 November
1990, admitting that they did compute to the last drop for the consumption of
the reagents and, thus, agreed to an alternative computation, thereby
incorporating a 20% allowance for quality control, 15% for wastage, 5% for
calibration, and 5% for uncontrolled consumption, or a total of 45% allowance. As a result, petitioner’s original claim for
excess tests in the amount of P2.8 million was reduced to P1,684,219.47.
Despite said adjustments, respondent remained adamant that no excess
tests were made. It is respondent’s
elucidation, in which the Court of Appeals agreed and on which it based its
reversal of the trial court’s Decision, that the word “test” must be understood
as “a procedure so conducted or performed in order to aid the physician in
making diagnosis of the patient.” As
such, according to the appellate court, petitioner was mistaken in considering
that testing involves other activities such as calibration and quality control
procedures; therefore, respondent should not be billed for such activities,
albeit, it still made use of the reagents and the equipment. The Court of Appeals expounded thus:
Upon a closer scrutiny of the
records of the instant case, the Court finds that it is the intention of the
parties that the defendant-appellant be charged only for actual tests, i.e. those
which are billable to patients, which are supported by the corresponding charge
slips and recorded in the defendant-appellant’s logbook, such logbook being
used as basis by the plaintiff-appellee in preparing
its sales invoices to the defendant-appellant.
x x x x
The court a quo should have given evidentiary weight to the said logbook as
the repository of the number of actual tests conducted by the
defendant-appellant which the plaintiff-appellee in
turn utilized as the basis for the billing statements prepared by it. x x x.
x x x x
While this Court likewise
makes the observation that the defendant-appellant might have extravagantly
consumed reagents in its conduct of laboratory examinations, such fact however
does not justify the Court a quo in
allowing the plaintiff-appellee to collect from the
defendant-appellant because that would amount to unnecessary judicial
interference which breaches the autonomy of the Lease Purchase Agreement duly
executed by both parties.[6]
We do not agree. First, it must be
stressed at this point that, as stated by the trial court, neither the logbook
nor the charge slips, which were supposed to show that no more than 150 tests
were conducted daily, were never presented before the trial court.[7] Thus, the assertions of respondent that no
excess test were made were never substantiated by any other evidence except the
bare testimonies of the two hospital employees it presented as witnesses. Therefore, we are at odds with the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the court a
quo should have given evidentiary weight to the said logbook as the
repository of the number of actual tests conducted by respondent. If said piece of evidence was never presented
before the trial court, then the court a quo
appropriately disregarded the supposed evidentiary importance of said logbook.
Second, a meticulous perusal of the Internal Memorandum of Marilyn Atienza, Chief Medical Technologist of respondent hospital,
cited by the appellate court in its Decision, and the annexes accompanying said
Memorandum, which contain respondent’s own computations for the use of the
reagents, would reveal that if indeed no excess exams were being conducted,
then the bulk of the reagents ordered by respondent were being used for quality
control and not for actual testing. According
to said computation, respondent was conducting 81,120 tests per year for
quality control, which is almost double the 46,800 tests done per year,[8] if
only 150 tests were indeed conducted daily.[9] This excessive use of reagents, to our minds,
is quite unreasonable, if not unbelievable.
Furthermore, it must be reiterated that in trying to oblige respondent’s
assertion that petitioner’s calculations neglected to take into account
necessary allowances for wastage, calibration, and quality control, petitioner
had adjusted its computation to give a 45% allowance for the use of the
reagents.
In the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty
or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff.[10] A careful examination of the evidence
presented by petitioner will show that it was able to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove its claim. As stated
above, petitioner has shown through testimonial and documentary evidence that
respondent had ordered an unusually large number of reagents used in the
operation of the “TECHNICON RA 1000”.
Petitioner was further able to show that a computation based on the
number of said orders would lead to the conclusion that respondent was able to
conduct tests in excess of the minimum 150 tests per day. Nonetheless, respondent failed to present
convincing evidence to sufficiently controvert this claim of petitioner that
excess tests were conducted on the “TECHNICON RA 1000”. As was pointed out earlier, neither the
logbook nor the charge slips, which were supposed to show that no more than 150
tests were conducted daily were never presented before the trial court.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent is liable for the amount of P1,684,219.82 representing the value of the tests conducted in
excess of the minimum 150 tests per day.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 41927, dated 26 March 2002, reversing the Decision dated 29 December 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, is hereby P1,684,219.82 representing the value
of the unreported tests, with 12% interest from P1,684,219.82 plus
accrued interest, petitioner is DIRECTED to execute the deed of absolute sale
and proper documentation to transfer ownership of the “TECHNICON RA 1000 Chemistry
Analyzer with Data Manager and Start-up Kit” to respondent.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 32-53.
[2] Penned by Judge Ramon O. Santiago;
Rollo, pp. 67-82.
[3] Annex “C”; Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[4] RTC
Decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 81-82.
[5] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[6] CA Decision, pp. 9, 14-15; Rollo, pp. 40, 45-46.
[7] RTC Decision, p.11; Rollo, p. 77.
[8] Based on 150 tests per day multiplied by 26 days in a month.
[9] Exhibits “4-B” and “4-C”; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 145-146.
[10] Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350
Phil. 138, 173 (1998).